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Abstract
Psychiatric inpatients, consisting of 32 males and 33
females between the ages of 15 and 58 completed Rotter's
(1966) Internal-External Locus of Control (I-E) Scale.

The

scale was administered individually to the patients at both
admission and discharge, at the Crisis Stabilization Unit
(CSU) in Orlando, Florida.

Analysis of variance was used

to determine whether there were significant differences due
to commitment status (voluntary and involuntary), diagnosis
(thought and affective and other disorders) , and change
scores (admission versus discharge) .

The hypothesis that

involuntary patients would produce significantly higher
scores was not confirmed.

Further, no significant differ-

ence was found due to diagnosis.

A second hypothesis that

patients would score more internally at the time of discharge versus initial admission also was not confirmed.
Therefore, there were no differences in I-E scores before or
after treatments regardless of diagnosis or commitment status.

There is no evidence to conclude that in terms of

treatment, involuntary commitment is detrimental to the
patients.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Involuntary commitment of patients to psychiatric facilities has "long perplexed the mental health and legal
professions"

(White and White, 1981, p. 953).

In the 18th

century, the few asylums in the United States were seen as
"places of last resort" which removed the insane person
from the community to protect the individual and the community.

As psychology developed in the 19th century, confine-

ment of the mentally ill took on rehabilitative aspects and
the state transferred responsibility for the treatment of
these individuals to the mental health profession.

Mean-

while, legal procedures were being established for the involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients (White and
White, 1981).
There has been much debate on involuntary hospitalization.

Chodoff (1976) examined three points of view concern-

ing society's right to involuntarily hospitalize a mentally
ill individual.

Chodoff labelled those persons who are op-

posed to involuntary commitment the "abolitionists".

The

abolitionists hold the viewpoint that involuntary hospitalization should never be resorted to under any circumstances.
Chodoff reports that many psychiatrists belong to this
group, and that for them, mental illness does not exist in
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the field of psychiatry.

The medical model of "mental ill-

ness" is rejected entirely, and acceptance of the medical
model is a "fiction accepted jointly by the state and by
psychiatrists as a device for exerting social control over
annoying or unconventional people"

(p. 497).

The abolition-

ists believe that these individuals should be allowed the
dignity of being responisible for their behavior and required to accept its consequences.

Members of this group

are not opposed to psychiatric treatment, but if voluntary
cooperation on the patient's part could not be enlisted,
then the psychiatrist would step aside and "allow social,
legal, and community sanctions to take their course"
(Chodoff, p. 497).
Chodof f labelled members of the second group the "medical model psychiatrists".

These physicians believe that

mental illness is a meaningful concept and that under certain conditions the state has the right and an obligation to
arrange for the hospitalization of a sick individual, even
if this means that he is deprived of his liberty.

It is

held that it would be far more cruel to leave the ill person
at liberty ! and that the patient has a ''right to treatment".
Chodoff wrote, "To remove the protective mantle of illness
from these disturbed people is to expose them, their families, and their communities to consequences that are certainly maladaptive and possibly irreparable"

(p. 497) .

He

insists that mental illness does exist, but he recognizes
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that not all people being treated by psychiatrists should be
included as being mentally ill, but that

t~ere

are those

desperately ill persons for whom involuntary commitment must
be considered.
Chodoff labels a third group the "civil liberties lawyers".

These persons do not necessarily reject the neces-

sity for involuntary hospitalization, but they do wish to
reject the importance of medical model criteria in the hands
of psychiatrists.

They believe the standards of dangerous-

ness are more objective and more capable of being handled in
the courts as it is more possible to bring evidence to bear
on each case.
Each group has its own arguments as to why their point
of view is valid.

The first and third groups argue that

psychiatrists are in the position of being able to abuse
their power, that they commit persons for reasons other than
the correct, legal, and ethical ones.

Hiday (1976) examined

commitment laws in one state by studying court records and
observing commitment hearings.

She concluded that although

fewer people are being committed, she still found occurrences where commitment resulted because the judges defferred to psychiatrist's opinions, rather than a preponderance of evidence.

In another study, Affleck, Peszke, and

Wintrob (1978) asked psychiatrists to respond to questionnaires regarding their knowledge of the commitment laws in
their jurisdictions.

They reported that few of the
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psychiatrists did have a thorough understanding of those
laws, that in some instances these physicians not only misunderstood the laws, but that they substituted their own
criteria to commit the patients.

In a series of newspaper

articles, Mathers (1982) pointed out that critics of
Florida's commitment law have charged that i t is used as a
tool to control indigents and vagrants.

It was also pointed

out that judges do not question the opinions of the psychiatrists at local commitment hearings.

However, a study

by Appelbaum and Hamm (1982) presents evidence to show that
in nearly all instances, psychiatrists involved in commitment proceedings are very aware of local commitment laws
and that they initiate commitment proceedings in accordance
with those laws.
Chodoff (1976) acknowledges that the potential for
abuse of these laws is there, but he still concluded that
involuntary commitment should still be the domain of the
medical model psychiatrists as they are in the best position
to deliver appropraite treatment to the patients, provided
those doctors can work with strict legal safeguards to
protect patient's rights.
Involuntary commitment itself is not the only issue to
be considered.

Courts have been reviewing committed pa-

tients' rights to refuse various types of treatment, most
notably, chemotherapy.

White and White (1981) addressed

this topic and report that, in general, the Supreme Court
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upholds the patient's right to refuse chemotherapy, except
where the patient is clearly a danger to himself or others.
Weiner (1982) reports that since the late 1960s there
have been numerous lawsuits filed against mental health institutions in an effort to improve patient care, define patients' rights and to narrow the criteria for civil commitment.

By and large, the district and appellate courts have

ruled in favor of the mental health advocates, but the reviews by the Supreme Court have resulted in decisions which
reject broadly worded commitment laws and which uphold the
traditional reliance on decision-making by medical professionals.

It appears that involuntary commitment of indivi-

duals who meet the criteria will continue to occur, but as
the courts rule in favor of patients' rights, alternatives
to the traditional medical model of treatment which includes
chemotherapy will have to be found.

White and White (1981)

state that there will be an increased demand by patients for
nonmedical treatments and that there will be a greater role
for psychology professionals in inpatient treatment in the
years ahead.
As evidenced above, much has been written on the ethical and legal aspects of involuntary hospitalization, but
little in the literature deals with the treatment of involuntarily committed patients.

Szasz (1977) addressed himself

to to the issue of treatment and concluded that in terms of
treatment, involuntary commitment is detrimental to the
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patient.

Szasz used this argument to support the abolition-

ist point of view described above.

However, in a study com-

paring both voluntary and involuntarily committed patignts,
Gove and Fain (1977) concluded that there is nothing detrimental to the patients in the commitment process.
In reviewing the literature, little was found on the
relationship between either voluntary or involuntary commitment and personality variables.

It would seem that invol-

untarily committed patients' perceptions of their own ability to control their lives would differ significantly from
patients who initiated hospitalization voluntarily.

Locus

of control is a personality variable which can be measured
to assess an individual's perception of his or her own ability to control his or her life circumstances.

There has

been research into locus of control in psychiatric patients
(Harrow and Ferrante, 1969; Fontana, Klein, Lewis and
Levine, 1968; Leggett and Archer, 1979), but most of these
have not addressed the topic of the relationship between locus of control and voluntary versus involuntary committed
patients.

One study (Levenson, 1972) described later in

this paper, · did look at the above mentioned relationship,
but she used her own locus of control measure, rather than
an older, more established measure of locus.
In the ensuing sections, locus of control will be defined and described.

Its origin in social learning theory

will be discussed, and locus of control as a personality
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variable, particularly for psychiatric patients, will be
examined.

Considerations in the measurements of locus of

control will be reviewed as well.

Procedures of involuntary

commitment unique to Florida law will be reviewed.

The pur-

pose of the present study is to examine locus of control
perceptions from both the voluntary and involuntary commitment frame of reference, in an effort to determine differences between the commitment alternatives.

II.

THE LOCUS OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT

Definition and Description of Locus of Control
Rotter (1966) did much of the original research on the
locus of control concept and he defined it as follows:
The effect on a reinforcement following some behavior
on a part of a human subject, in other words, is not a
simple stamping-in process, but depends upon whether or
not the person perceives a causal relationship between
his own behavior and the reward. A perception of
causal relationships need not be all or none, but can
vary in degree. When a reinforcement is perceived by
the subject as following some action of his own but not
being entirely contingent upon his action, then, in our
culture, i t is typically perceived as the result of
luck, chance, fate, as under the control of powerful
others, or as unpredictable because of the great complexity of the forces surrounding him. When the event
is interpreted in this way by an individual, we have
labelled this a belief in external control. If the
person perceives that the event is contingent upon his
own behavior or ·his own relatively permanent characteristics, we have termed this a belief in internal control (p. 1).
Locus of control, then, refers to one's orientation as
to his or her own ability (or lack thereof) to control,
through his or her own behavior, subsequent reward or punishrnent.

Phares (1976) sees locus of control as a continuum.

Persons who believe that they can control reinforcement
through their own behavior (internals) are at one extreme,
while persons who believe that reinforcement is independent
of their behavior (externals) are at the other extreme.
further suggests that "perceived locus of control may be
8

He
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viewed as a somewhat narrow expectancy arising out of a
specific situation or i t may be viewed as a relatively
stable characteristic that persons carry with them from
situation to situation"

(p. 6).

He further points out that

"behavior is determined both by the structure of the situation and by the beliefs or expectancies brought to the situation by that person, with the relative contribution of each
varying from situation to situation in lawful ways"

(p. 6).

Various researchers have addressed themselves in describing the characteristics of internals versus externals.
In reviewing the literature, Kinnaird (1977) wrote a character sketch of persons with an internal locus orientation
versus persons with an external locus orientation:
To summarize, a character sketch of the individual with
internal locus of control shows him to be a striving,
cognitive, achievement-oriented, self-directed person
who copes actively with his environment and expects to
succeed.
He is likely to be white and of middle class
or higher status, and have had a secure and consistent
upbringing.
The external individual is apt to come
from a less stable home, a lower socio-economic level,
and/or ethnic minority and to be less likely to seek
information or attempt to control his environment, but
is more likely to take a chance (p. 39).
Joe (1971) reported that many researchers have investigated the relation of internal-external locus of control to
personality characteristics, and he drew the following conclusion:
The findings depict externals, in contrast to internals,
as being relatively anxious, aggressive, dogmatic~ an~
less trustful and more suspicious of others, lacking in
self-confidence and insight, having low needs for
social approval, and having a greater tendency to use
sensitizing modes of defenses (p. 623) ·
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On the other hand, internals seem better able to cope
with their environment and are more self-confident and
self-directed than are externals.
support this view.

There are much data to

Several researchers indicated that in-

ternal individuals are most likely to have satisfactory personal adjustment {Joe, 1971; Phares, 1976; Hersch and
Scheibe, 1967).

Phares (1976) describes internals as

active, striving individuals who exhibit greater resistance to influence and who seem to handle success
and failure in a more realistic fashion than externals
... by contrast, externals should be more vulnerable and
less capable of coping with their environment (p. 120).
However, Rotter {1966) saw a curvilinear relationship
between locus of control and pathology, where persons at
both extremes of the internal-external continuum are seen as
maladjusted.

But, Rotter (1975) also pointed out that one

problem in conceptualization of the locus of control construct is the idea that internals are good and externals are
bad.

He states that there is no logical basis to assume

that it is good to be internal and bad to be external.

Re-

searchers need to be aware of this and avoid the mistake of
assuming pathology just because a person's scores on a locus
of control measure show him to have an external frame of
reference.

Origin of Locus of Control in Social Learning Theory
Social learning theory of personality integrates both
reinforcement and cognitive approaches.

It defines person
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ality as learned behavior which is the result of the interaction of learned responses, acquired meanings, and physiological factors.

This learned behavior is modifiable and

changes with experience.

Social learning has been described

in various papers (Rotter, 1954, 1966; Phares, ·1976).

The

locus of control concept developed out of social learning
theory and interest in this variable developed as Rotter
and others made the consistent observation that "increments
and decrements in expectancies following reinforcement appeared to vary systematically, depending on the nature of
the situation and also as a consistent characteristic of
the person being reinforced"
Rotter (1975)
havior as:
or negative;

(1)
(2)

(Rotter, 1975, p. 56).

sees the crucial determinants of be-

the reinforcement, whether it is positive
the past history, sequence, and patter-

ning of such reinforcements; and (3)
each reinforcement.

the value attached to

In an earlier article, Rotter (1966)

listed four classes of variables which are important in predieting behavior in the context of reinforcement theory.
These classes of variables are behavior, expectancies, reinfor~ements,

and phychological situations.

He utilized these

variables in his general definition of behavior:
The potential for a behavior to occur in any specific
psychological situation is a function of the expectancy that the behavior will lead to a particular reinforcement in that situation and the value of that reinforcement (1975, p. 57).
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Phares (1976) defined those variables important in predicting behavior which were listed above.

Reinforcement is

"anything that has an effect on the occurrence, direction,
or kind of behavior"

(p. 15) .

Rotter (1954) defined expect-

ancy as the "probability held by the individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as a function of a specific
behavior on his part in a specific situation or situations"
(p. 107) •

Phares (1976) differentiated between generalized

and specific expectancies by pointing out that when individuals were in a novel situation, "generalized expectancies
will be more important in determining their expectancy than
will specific expectancies based on prior experience in that
situation.

When individuals have had a great deal of experi-

ence in a given situation, generalized expectancies will be
the primary determinants"

(p. 16) .

One determinant of the

relative importance of generalized versus specific expectancies (in the same situation) is the amount of experience the
individual has had in that particular situation.

In deter-

mining behavior, the importance of generalized expectancies
goes up as various situations are more novel and go down as
a person's experience in that particular situation increases.
It is important to understand the relationships of expectancies to situations.

According to Rotter (1975), this helps

us to understand under what conditions clear predictions
might be exptected from an accurate measure of generalized
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expectancies, such as his internal-external (I-E) locus of
control scale (Rotter, 1966).
In social learning theory, the psychological situation
is seen as an important determinant of behavior.

Phares

(1976) suggests that careful analysis of situations is important in order to identify the cues that can, for a given
person, affect the expectancies and reinforcement values.
"Although personality traits or dispositions are important,
failure to take account of the psychological situation significantly reduces predictive efficiency"

(p. 17).

He also

pointed out that the structure of a specific situation affects an individual's behavior as well as that person's generalized beliefs about locus of control.

Phares (1976) sum-

marized this by pointing out that locus of control can be
seen as a more or less stable characteristic which persons
carry with them from situation to situation, or as a somewhat narrow expectancy which arises out of some specific
situation.

Measurement of Locus of Control
In view of the fact that locus of control may be seen
as a stable characteristic generalizable across many situations or a narrow expectancy associates with a specific
situation, i t is obvious that different measures of locus of
control are necessary, depending upon the purpose of the research.

To devise a good instrument, Phares (1976) points
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out that it is desirable to make clear exactly what is being measured.
There have been several measures of locus of control,
for both adults and children.

The scope of this paper does

not permit exhaustive explanations of each measure, but they
are listed, and those that seem pertinent to this work will
be described in more detail.
One of the earlier measuring devices was the Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaires (IAR) developed by Crandall, Katkovsky, and Crandall (1965).

This meas-

ure focuses on locus of control in intellectual achievement
situations, and is used primarily with children.

Another

measurement used with children is the Nowicki-Strickland
Locus of Control Scale for Children (1973).

The authors re-

port that studies have found significant correlations between this measure and achievement test scores.

For pre-

school children, the Stanford Preschool Internal-External
Scale (SPIES) was developed by Mischel, Zeiss, and Zeiss
(1974).
Perhaps the most important measure of locus of control
has been Rotter's (1966) Internal-External (I-E) Locus of
Control Scale.

Here, the items on the scale represent an

attempt to sample locus of control beliefs across a wide
range of situations, such as interpersonal situations, government, work, and politics (Phares, 1976).

Because it sam-

ples a wide range of expectancies, the I-E scale is a
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measure of generalized, rather than specific, expectancies.
Phares (1976) explains what the I-E scale, a generalized
measure of locus of control, can and cannot do:
What a general measure of locus of control allows us to
do is describe each individual's "average" locus of control attributes over many situations. But we should
remember that the wider the range of situations, the
less predictive the concept will be. Therefore, I-E
may do a good job of predicting people's behavior in
general but miss rather badly in any specific situation. Whether we can tolerate such misses depends upon
our purposes (p. 46).
Rotter (1966) designed the I-E scale unidimensionally,
that is, a person's score reflects whether he is internal or
external on a continuum, with internals at one end and externals at the other.

The I-E scale is seen as a measure of

generalized, rather than specific, expectancies because the
questions on this scale represent an attempt to sample locus
of control beliefs in a wide range of situations (Phares,
1976).

The I-E scale consists of 29 items, presented in a

dyadic, forced choice format.

One point is given each time

an external statement is selected by the subject, and the
possible range of scores is from zero to 23.

Included in

the scale are six filler items which are not scored.

Phares

reports that filler items were included to at least partially disguise the purpose of the questionnaire.
Phares (1976) states that the test-retest reliability
for the I-E scale appears to be adequate.

Rotter (1966) re-

ported that reliabilities for several samples varied from
.49 to .83, depending upon the sample and time interval
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involved.

Concerning psychiatric patients, Harrow and

Ferrante (1969) reported a reliability figure of .75 over
a six week period.

Using college students for subjects,

Hersch and Scheibe (1967) administered the I-E scale and
three different measures of intelligence and reported that
correlations between the I-E scale and intelligence were
nonsignificant.
It may appear that a generalized measure would be impotent in the face of so many specific situations.

But

Phares (1976) cites reasons for conceptualizing personality
in terms of broad dispositions and having appropriate measures for them.

For instance, the clinician/psychologist must

predict what patients are likely to do in situations and
circumstances that are unknown to them.

He may be asked, for

example, "if John Doe is discharged from the hospital, how
will he do?"

In other words, the clinician is being asked

about the effects of many situations, not just one.

Most

clinicians have no way of knowing what will happen to Mr.
Doe five years in the future.

Phares (1976) concludes, "The

lack of information regarding the nature of specific situations may force us to rely more heavily than we would like on
general personality factors"

(p. 47).

It is for this reason

that Rotter's I-E scale has been used so often since first
presented.

Rotter's (1966) monograph on locus of control

has not only prompted much research (Thornhill, Thornhill,
and Youngman [197~

presented a computerized bibliography on

17
locus of control which had over 1200 references) , but also
generated criticism as well.
The criticism of the I-E scale centers around two
issues.

The first concerns the issue of specificity-

generality, which has been alluded to earlier.

As pointed

out, the I-E scale measures generalized rather than specific
expectancies of locus of control.

Rotter (1975) noted that

previous researchers have misused the I-E scale by trying to
use it in the prediction of specific behaviors for specific
situations, and he urged researchers to take this into consideration before designing their research.

He pointed out

that i t would be a difficult undertaking to construct a different measure for each conceivable specific purpose, but
also acknowledged that specific measures do have their place.
One measure of specific expectancies that is of use
with psychiatric patients is the Mental Health Locus of Control (MHLC) Scale developed by Hill and Bale (1981).

This

scale is designed to measure specific expectancies concerning who will be in control, that is, responsible for change,
in mental health treatment situations.

These authors point

out that what clients expect from a therapist will influence
such vitally important processes as whether the clients take
the first step in entering therapy and how these clients interpret and respond to treatment.

These expectancies can

also play a role in determining the course and eventual outcome of treatment.

Hill and Bale state that the MHLC is
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designed specifically to meet the need for an instrument to
measure locus of control expectancies for situation involving client-therapist interactions.
statements concerning mental health.

The MHLC contains 28
With each statement

there is a six point scale which allows the subject to agree
or disagree with that particular statement.

Included in

this measure are six filler items, as in Rotter's I-E scale.
Also, like the I-E scale, the MHLC is a bipolar construct
where the two poles represent belief in either internal or
external control.
Hill and Bale (1981) also developed a second scale, the
Mental Health Locus of Origin (MHLO) Scale.

Constructed in

a similar manner to the MHLC, and MHLO scale is designed to
measure beliefs about the etiology of psychological problems.
At one end of this scale is a component labelled endogenous
beliefs which refers to patients' perceptions attributing
"mental illness" to factors such as heredity and organicity.
At the other end of the scale is the interactional pole,
where persons perceptions regarding the etiology of mental
illness emphasizes interpersonal and intropsychic causes of
mental illness.
Hill and Bale (1981) analyzed the validity of their
MHLC and MHLO scales using 147 female and 79 male college
students.

They found that the correlation between the MHLC

and MHLO scales was .40 (p(.001).

Using the same 226 college

students, they also compared the correlation between MHLC
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and MHLO, the correlation was .18 (p<.OOl).

They concluded

that their measures were valid, but they also pointed out
that they used college students in their samples, and they
recognized the need for validity studies using different
subject populations.
A second criticism of the I-E scale which has generated
other research has been the issue of unidimensionalitymulti-dimensionali ty.

For instance, Levenson (1981), ques-

tioned "the validity of combining under the rubric of external control, as Rotter did, the expectancies of fate, chance,
and powerful others"

(p. 15).

Levenson (1973) had developed

her own locus of control scale which separated the I-E scale
into three different dimensions of expectancy, which were
presented as scales:

the Internal (I) Scale, the Powerful

Others (P) Scale, and the Chance (C) Scale.

The I, P, and C

scales originated because of . the idea that people who believe
in one external orientation such as the belief in the powerful others will think and act differently than those who see
the world as unpredictable, which is a different external
orientation.

Levenson points out that the major implication

of this was that individuals who see the world as unordered
should be expected to act differently from people who believe powerful others are in control.
Levenson (1973) administered her I, P, and C scales to
psychiatric patients in a state hospital and found that patients who were involuntarily committed held the attitude
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that powerful others controlled their lives (an external
orientation) significantly more than voluntary psychiatric
patients.

She also reports, however, that there were no

significant differences between committed and voluntary patients on her other two scales, the internal and chance
scales.
It should be noted, however, that Rotter (1966) acknowledged the multidimensionality aspect and reported that
he also attempted to isolate different dimensions.

Rotter

reported that these isolated dimensions in his early research were not sufficiently reliable to indicate separate
subscales.

Phares (1976) makes this comment about multi-

dimensional scales:

"Obviously, if one constructs a scale

so that it reflects several dimensions, it is not surprising
to find evidence of such dimensions"

(p. 50) .

He concluded

that while there is evidence of separate factors, there is
less evidence that demonstrates their ability to make accurate predictions.
To summarize, there are several different measures of
locus of control which are available to the researcher.
Which measure is selected depends on the purpose of the research involved.

Rotter's I-E scale has been used exten-

sively in locus research which includes studies involving
psychiatric patients.

It is important to realize that this

scale measures generalized expectancies, rather than specific expectancies, in adults.

This scale cannot make specific
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predictions of behavior, but it can assist the clinician in
making generalized predictions of behavior.

Locus of Control as a Personality Variable
Joe (1971) reviewed the literature on locus of control
as a personality variable.

He looked at the relation of I-E

scale scores to personality characteristics, ethnic and
social class differences, anxiety, attempts to control the
environment, achievement motivation, reaction to social
stimuli, reaction to threat, risk-taking, and psychological
adjustment.
In addition, he examined locus of control research with
anxiety as measured by self-report measures.

Externals de-

scribed themselves as anxious, less able to show constructive
responses to frustration, and more concerned with fear of
failure than with achievement.

Internals, on the other hand,

described themselves as more concerned with achievement,
more constructive in overcoming frustration, and being less
anxious.
Joe (1971) also cited a group of studies that support
the hypothesis that internals show more initiative and effort in controlling their environment, and can better control their impulses than externals.
study by Seeman and Evans (1962).

Related to this is a
Using tuberculosis pa-

tients, they focused on the relationships between locus of
control and knowledge and information seeking behaviors of
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the patients.

They found that internals asked more ques-

tions of doctors and nurses, and knew more about their specific situation than did externals.
Joe (1971)

reported that several investigators had de-

monstrated a relationship between internal-external locus of
control and psychological adjustment, where pathological
subjects were reported to have higher external scores than
normal subjects.
Rotter's

(1966)

Hersch and Scheibe (1967) administered
I-E scale and other self-report measures

such as the Incomplete Sentences Blank (ISB) , the California
Psychological Inventory (CPI) and the Psychasthenia section
of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),
to college students.

These authors report that internal

scorers on the I-E scale are less maladjusted as shown by
their scores on the other measures administered.
Joe (1971)

further noted that studies involving locus

of control and social class and ethnic differences found
that blacks and lower class persons usually had higher external scores than did whites and middle class persons.

In

reviewing these studies, he concludes:
Data are consistent with the theoretical expectation
that individuals who are restricted by environmental
barriers and feel subjected to limited material opportunities would develop an externally oriented outlook
on life.
Also, social class interacts with race so
that individuals from the lower classes and minority
groups tend to have high expectancies of external control (p. 624).
Joe (1971)

also reviewed the research as concerns locus

of control and persons' reactions to social stimuli.

Rotter

23

(1966) hypothesized that internals would be able to resist
environmental manipulations (provided that they were aware
of those manipulations) , while externals would be less resistive as they already had expectancies of environmental
control.

Joe (1971)

found that some studies have confirmed

this hypothesis while others have not.

He suggested that

"more attention should be given to exploring the hypothesis
that internals conform only if they perceive conforming to
be to their advantage"
Joe (1971)

(p. 630).

reports also that the research indicates a

relationship between suicide proneness and externality, and
that externals tended to more often report feelings of anger
and depression.

In reviewing these results and the results

showing that pathological subjects had higher external
scores, Joe questioned whether "a belief in external control .
produces psychopathology or whether psychopathology produces
a belief in external control"

(p. 633).

He then concluded

that the study of locus of control is relevant to studying
psychopathology.

This is reflected in several studies con-

cerning psychiatric patients.

Locus of Control and Psychiatric Patients
As Joe indicated, several researchers have found a re- lationship between locus of control and psychological adjustment.

Shybut (1968) reported that psychotic subjects had

higher external scores than did neurotic and normal subjects.
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He also suggested that prolonged hospitalization can cause
a person's belief in external control to be increased and
reduce his belief that he can attain long-range goals.
Levenson (1973) administered her I, P, and C scales to functionally psychotic and neurotic inpatients in a state hospital.

Results showed that, when compared to normal samples,

the inpatients perceived control by chance forces and powerful other significantly more often.

She readministered her

scales to the patients one month later.

While overall the

patients scored higher on the Internal scale, there was no
significant difference in patient's scores on the Chance and
Powerful Others scales.

Levenson speculated as to these re-

sults:
It may be that the patients who remained in the hospital long enough to be retested were less susceptible
to change on these measures, or that high perceptions
of control by powerful others or chance were maintained
as a function of prolonged length of institutionalization (p. 404).
This result suggests that as length of hospitalization increases, patients' perceptions of external control do not
diminish.
Harrow and Ferrante (1969) administered Rotter's I-E
scale to upper middle class patients during their first and
seventh weeks of hospitalization.

These authors looked at

general characteristics of locus of control in these patients with the following factors in mind:

the distribution

of patients on the locus of control continuum; the relationship between their I-E scores and diagnoses; and the
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relationships between their I-E scores and age and sex.
They also looked at locus of control score changes following
seven weeks of hospitalization to determine (1) whether or
not psychiatric patients become more internal as their pathology decreases during treatment;

(2) how changes in their

I-E scores were related to their formal diagnosis and (3)
how locus of control orientation changes were related to age
and sex.
Overall, the authors report that data collected on
their psychiatric samples did not differ significantly from
non-psychiatric samples.

The mean locus of control score

obtained from the samples overall was 8.70, well within the
range of mean scores listed by Rotter (1966).

Harrow and

Ferrante created diagnostic subgroups in the following way:
schizophrenics, depressives, character disorders, manics,
and other.

They reported that the schizophrenic subgroup

had a mean score of 10.07, which was significantly above the
mean of the total remaining subjects.

This shows that, as a

group, schizophrenics were more external in locus orientation.

Harrow and Ferrante explained why they thought schiz-

ophrenics exhibit more externality:
Looked at in terms of their history, the schizophrenic
sample should contain a greater percentage of patients
who have had long-standing difficulties in adjustment
and have experienced chronic disappointment. Furth~r
more, this disorder includes symptoms such as delusions
and paranoid ideation which are threatening to others,
produce greater social stigma and may ~ead to a se~se
of personal futility, with some resulting externality
(p.

584).
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Depressives, in this study, tended to produce more internal scores.

The authors account for this finding by ex-

plaining that in the population they studied, the depressives
had a better premorbid adjustment and that their disorder
was not as chronic as the schizophrenic.
Harrow and Ferrante (1969) reported that patients
classified as character disorders also scored more internally than schizophrenics.

They pointed out that these pa-

tients usually have problems in only one or two areas which
are usually related to their lifestyle, and that for the
most part, these patients have performed in social and occupational areas in a competent way for many years.
Harrow and Ferrante pointed out that when manics are
initially hospitalized, they usually are displaying grandiose thinking about their ability to control their lives.
This was suggested to explain the result that manic patients
were significantly more internal in locus orientation than
the total sample of non-manic patients.
As mentioned earlier, the I-E scale was readministered
at the end of six weeks treatment in this study.

It was

predicted that patients would be more internal, based on the
hypothesis that an increased sense of personal mastery,
brought about by symptom relief, could lead towards increased internality.

Results indicated that there was a

trend towards internality, but it was non-significant.

But

when analyzed by the different subgroups, different results
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were evident.

Schizophrenics were more external, but this

trend was non-significant as well.

These schizophrenics

were considered very "sick" and the chronicity of their problems seemed to account for these results.

In general, the

non-schizophrenics {not counting the manics) did become
slightly more internal during the six weeks of treatment.
This was seen particularly in those patients labelled character disorders.

The authors acknowledged that much of the

character pathology remained in these patients, but accounted
for this result by pointing out that at least the acute reason for their admission had been relieved and these patients
were now free to return to their old level of functioning.
Depressed patients scored significantly more internally
when the I-E scale was read.ministered.

As their symptoms

diminished, the patients became more internal.

The authors

believed that as the patients returned to their premorbid
levels of self-esteem and control, their confidence increased and hence, the more internal score.
At the end of the six weeks, manic-depressive patients
became more external.

Harrow and Ferrante pointed out that

during hospitalization they recover from their original
grandiosity and become more aware of their own limitations.
This shift towards externality, in manics, is considered to
be a shift towards reality, hence a positive outcome of
treatment.

No significant differences were noted between

younger and older patients at the end of six weeks treatment,
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when the I-E scale was readministered.

However, there was

evidence to show that females, in general, scored more internally.
Overall, Harrow and Ferrante's study showed that acute
psychiatric symptoms and hospitalization did influence some
of the I-E scores in one direction or the other, depending
on the patient's diagnosis.

This study supports Rotter's

(1966) contention that persons scoring near the extreme ends
of the I-E continuum

~re

more maladjusted whereas persons

scoring in the middle are more likely to be better adjusted
psychologically.

The study also suggests that, in psychi-

atric patients, an external orientation can be changed to an
internal one.
Related to Harrow and Ferrante's results is a study by
Fontana, Klein, Lewis and Levine (1968).

They demonstrated

that schizophrenics who wanted to appear very sick scored in
the external direction on the I-E scale.

Of these results,

Joe (1971) writes, "The implication is that internals wish
to convey to others that they are normal and well adjusted
while externals wish to impress upon others that they are
"sick" so they cannot be held accountable for their behavior"

(p. 634).

This study also supports Rotter's idea that

individuals at the extreme ends of the locus of control
continuum are maladjusted.

III.

THE INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF
PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS

Criteria on Procedures for Involuntary Conunitrnent
Chodoff (1976) listed three criteria which should be
utilized in determining whether or not a patient should be
committed.

All three must be met, according to Chodoff,

before a patient can be conunitted.

First, the person should

be suffering from a mental illness.

Chodoff points out that

this is a complex concept, and there is lack of consensus
about its meaning.

His explanation of this concept, "ex-

tends the domain of illness to encompass certain forms of
social deviance as well as biological disorders .... They
(the patients) are all suffering both emotionally and physically, they are incapable by an effort of will of stopping
or changing their destructive behavior, and · those around
them consider them to be in an undesirable sick state and
to require medical attention"

(p. 498) .

He points out that

only a belief in the existence of mental illness can justify
involuntary commitment.

By looking at mental illness in

terms of the medical model, it is understood that physicians
are considered to be the "technically competent experts to
deal with its effects"

(p. 498).

Secondly, the person must

be experiencing a disruption of both intrapsychic (e.g.,
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depression, debilitating anxiety) and interpersonal (acting
out towards others due to paranoid ideation, for example)
functioning.

Chodoff points out that this does not include

a person's "minor peccadilloes or eccentricities"

(p. 498).

Also, "the behavior in question must represent symptoms of
the mental illness from which the person is suffering"
(p. 498).

Included in these symptoms are those actions which

cause a person to be a danger to himself or others.

Third,

there must be a need for care and treatment, and there must
be facilities available for this purpose.

Chodoff argues

that if the state has the right to define those conditions
necessary to commit someone, then the doctors have the right
to ask for treatability of the patients as a criterion for
commitment as well.
Chodoff concludes that these procedures and criteria
apply particularly to chronic recurrences and initial episodes of mental illness.

Admittedly, Chodoff is in favor of

involuntary commitment when appropriate, but he draws this
conclusion in discussing the criteria for commitment:
"it is necessary to find a way to satisfy legal and humanitarian considerations and yet allow psychiatrists access to
initially and acutely ill patients in order to do the best
that they can for them"

(p. 498).

In Florida, the guidelines for the commitment of mentally ill persons are similar to those outlined by Chodof f
above.

According to Florida State Statutes, Chapter 394,
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Section 463, a person may be taken to a psychiatric receiving facility involuntarily under the following circumstances:
1.

He is mentally ill.

2.

He has refused voluntary examination by a doctor.

3.

He is unable to determine for himself that such

examination is necessary.
4.

He is a danger to himself or others, or he is un-

able to care for himself.
This period of involuntary examination, according to the
Florida statutes, is not to exceed 72 hours without a court
order for further treatment.
Initiation of involuntary examination is done by the
following methods:
1.

A court order, called an ex parte order, can cause

a person to be taken to · a receiving facility.

Usually court

orders are obtained by friends and family members of the
patient, or by social service workers with the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS).

Usually three re-

sponsible adults swear out affidavits attesting to the problems of the patient in question, and after review by a circuit court judge, the order is issued.
2.

A law enforcement officer may take a person who ap-

pears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination described above to a receiving facility for examination.

That

officer is required to make a written report as to his reasons for bringing the pat1ent to that facility.
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3.

A physician, psychologist, psychiatric nurse, or

clinical social worker (all licensed through the State of
Florida) may also initiate involuntary examination.

They,

too, are required by law to make a written report as to
their reasons for initiating the examination.
After the person has arrived at the receiving facility,
he is evaluated by a licensed physician.

If that physician

agrees with the need for inpatient treatment and that the
legal criteria are met, he signs documents initiating the
involuntary (inpatient) examination, which cannot exceed 72
hours.

If the psychiatrists in the receiving facility be-

lieve that the person needs longer inpatient treatment,
then two psychiatrists or a psychiatrist and a psychologist
are required to initiate proceedings for involuntary commitment (this must be done within the 72 hour examination
period).

However, before a person can be committed, he has

the right to a court hearing (which he also has the right to
waive) in which the judge makes a decision concerning the
disposition of the patient.
Plan A:

The judge has three alternatives:

The person may be sent to a long term psy-

chiatric treatment facility.

The amount of time a patient

spends there depends upon the severity of his illness.

None-

theless, patients committed in this manner are reviewed
periodically by the courts and the hospital physicians.
Plan B:

The judge may decide to release the person in-

to his own care.
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Plan C:

The patient may be required to participate

in inpatient treatment, usually 14 to 30 days, in a local
psychiatric facility.
Hereafter, for the purposes of this paper, commitment
will refer to those individuals who are placed in a psychiatric facility involuntarily, whether for examination or
actual commitment.

A Comparison of Involuntary Versus Voluntary Patients
In an attempt to compile more pertinent information as
concerns the debate on involuntary commitment, authors have
focused on comparisons of voluntary versus involuntary psychiatric patients in hospital settings.

Zwerling, Karasu,

Plutchik and Kellerman (1974) did such a comparison, noting
similarities and differences on different variables such as
age, sex, religion, marital status, educational levels, and
household composition.

There were no significant differences

between voluntary and involuntary patients.

In their study,

committed patients were found to have had prior hospitalization.

Also, voluntary patients were much more likely to

have been referred by family and friends, where committed patients were referred by police, courts, or private psychiatric clinics.

Zwerling et al. interpreted this to mean

that "involuntary patients may be more chronically ill, or
perhaps the treatment itself creates an aversion for seeking
additional treatment voluntarily"

(p. 83).
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The patients were also assessed according to symptoms
and it was found that voluntary patients had problems with
depression and feelings of inferiority and that committed
patients more often (but not significantly) showed more delusions and inappropriate affect.

In looking over their data,

Zwerling et al. did not find any significant differences in
the overall severity of illness between voluntary and committed patients, but did find that committed patients were
more likely to be schizophrenic, assaultive, and agitated,
while voluntary patients complained of depression, alcohol
abuse, and drug abuse.

It was also learned that committed

patients more frequently left the hospital without permission (eloped) than voluntary patients.
After assessing their overall information, the authors
concluded that their results "offer ammunition for both
sides of the debate concerning involuntary hospitalization"
(p. 86).

They argued that the high elopement rate of com-

mitted patients strengthens the anticornmitment positions of
the civil libertarians.

But they also stated that many pa-

tients who had refused hospitalization but were committed
against their will did come to accept that hospitalization.
The authors acknowledged that because of the patient's
state of mind, commitment was the only way that some patients' "right to treatment" could be protected.

But these

authors held a critical view of commitment in their final
conclusion:

"Whether their numbers (that of patients who
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need involuntary commitment) justify the perpetuation of a
machinery for involuntary hospitalization which is so patently and relentlessly open to overuse and outright abuse
is a judgment we leave to society--it is too grave an issue
to be left to the mental health professionals"

(p. 86).

Gove and Fain (1977) followed up the above mentioned
study and compared voluntary and involuntary patients before,
during and after admission to a psychiatric hospital.

In

the prehospital phase, demographic information was gathered
on the patients, and it was learned that committed patients
tended to have a lower income than voluntary patients, but
both had approximately the same educational levels, and
voluntary patients were more likely to have been employed.
At the time of admission, psychiatrists noted whether
the patient was severely distressed by observing signs of
worry, dysphoria, and agitation.

They also noted whether

the patient was disorganized in this thinking (e.g., hallucinations, delusions, flight of ideas, gross confusion, etc.)
and the severity of that disorganization.

The collected

data indicated that voluntary patients experience distress
more than committed patients.

The authors suggest that this

means that the commitment process, in and of itself, does
not seriously distress most patients.

However, this dif-

ference can reflect another explanation.

The involuntary

patients' lack of distress may be due to their tho~ght disorder.

In fact, the admitting psychiatrists also indicated
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that thought disorganization was more likely to play a role
in initiating hospitalization for committed patients than
for voluntary patients.

They also indicated that committed

patients were more likely to be assaultive prior to admission.

Gove and Fain (1977) concluded that upon admission,

committed patients tended to have a more severe disorder
than voluntary patients.
A record was kept of how long it took to bring the patient's symptoms under control and it was discovered that it
took considerably longer to bring the disorganization of the
committed patients under control as opposed to the voluntary
patients, and committed patients tended to have a longer hospitalization.

They also indicated that after controlling

for severity of impairment, committed patients still had a
longer hospitalization ..
Citing data

regardi~g

whether or not patients had re-

sided in an institution prior to hospitalization and data as
to whether or not the patients had to return to an institution, the authors concluded that the commitment process does
not increase the patient's chance of becoming chronically
institutionalized.

The authors also examined follow-up data

on the social performance of the patients.

Following hos-

pitalization, there was a general improvement for both voluntary and committed patients.

Gove and Fain (1977) con-

cluded here that "this provides strong evidence that hospitalization did not have a detrimental effect on either type
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of patient and is consistent with the view that both types
of patients can be helped by hospitalization" (p. 675).

Pa-

tients were also followed up as to their own attitudes towards being hospitalized.

The majority of patients, both

voluntary and conunitted, indicated that they saw themselves
as being helped by hospitalization.
Gove and Fain (1977) differed from Zwerling et al. in
that after having analyzed their data, they concluded that
there is nothing seriously debilitating in the commitment
process and that, given . good treatment facilities, commitment is a reasonable course of action when a patient is
seriously ill.

Despite reserverations cited in other re-

search about involuntary conunitment (Zwerling et al., 1975),
the study above indicates that generally, involuntary commitment is not debilitating and should be continued in those
extreme cases when it is the only reasonable course of action.
There are major differences between involuntary and
voluntary patients on several variables.

Committed patients

usually manifest a more severe type of disorder which will
likely have an effect on locus of control orientation, at
least

init~ally,

when the patient is in acute distress.

One

way to control for this in a reasearch project would be to
administer the locus of control measure both at the beginning and near the end of treatment in a manner similar to
Harrow and Ferrante's (1969) study.

IV.

RESEARCH PROJECT

Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to determine if voluntary
versus involuntary committed mental health patients differ
in terms of their locus of control orientation.

For this

study, the instrument used was Rotter's Internal-External
(I-E) Locus of Control Scale which measures the degree that
a person perceives his own ability to control events through
his own actions.

This measure of generalized expectancies

was chosen for the following reasons:
1)

Since clinicians are often asked to make generalized

predictions about a patient's future behavior, a measure of
generalized, rather than specific, expectancies seems appropriate.
2)

The I-E scale has never been used in research spe-

cific to voluntary versus involuntary patients.
3)

The I-E scale has demonstrated its reliability in

a variety of research.
4)

Levenson (1973) administered her I, P, and C scales

to patients to compare those involuntarily committed patients with the voluntary patients, and learned that involuntary patients held the attitude that powerful others controlled their lives.

This is an external orientation, and
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it is expected that on the I-E scale, committed patients
would also score in an external direction.
Using Rotter's (1966) I-E scale to measure locus of
control, this paper was concerned with the following hypotheses:
1.

There is a significant difference in locus of con-

trol scores between voluntary and involuntarily committed
psychiatric patients.

As has been shown, voluntary patients

play a role in their own hospitalization, while committed
patients do not.

Since the voluntary patients had a hand in

the initiation of their treatment, it is expected that they
would score significantly more often as being internally
oriented.

Also, the voluntary group is more likely to have

a large group of depressives, and previous studies (Harrow
and Ferrante, 1969) show them more likely to score in the
internal range.

Schizophrenics, on the other hand, are more

likely to be committed because of their thought disorganization, and previous research (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969)
indicates that on the I-E scale, they score in the external
range of the locus continuum.

For these reasons, a signifi-

cant difference in locus of control scores is expected, with
voluntary patients scoring in the internal range, and committed patients scoring more in the external range.
2.

Locus of control scores in the committed and volun-

tary patients will change at the end of treatment, after the
patient has been stabilized.

Previous research indicates
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that after seven weeks of treatment, patients score more
internally (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969), as they experienced
symptom relief.

Gove and Fain (1977) reported that psychi-

atric patients, in general, come to see themselves as being
helped by the hospitalization, and this included both voluntary and committed patients.

Similar improvements, as

stabilization is implemented, seem likely to occur in the
setting being studied here as well.

It is expected that to-

wards the end of treatment, both voluntary and involuntary
patients would score more in the internal direction.

Method
Subjects
The subjects were 32 male and 33 female psychiatric
patients admitted to the Orange County, Florida Crisis
Stabilization Unit (CSU), described below.

These subjects

represent various types of psychiatric diagnoses and problems requiring hospitalization.

Some of the subjects had

been placed involuntarily as per Florida statutes, while
others were voluntary patients.

All patients at the CSU are

diagnosed according to the Diagnostic and Statistical M~nual
of Mental Disorders, Edition III (DSM III), and the diagnosis was determined by a licensed, practicing psychiatrist
on the unit.

Demographically, the patient sample is typical

of inpatient settings housing indigent patients.

The female

patients ranged in age from 15 to 58 years with the mean
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age being 30.9.

Males ranged from 16 to 57 years with the

mean age being 28.5.

Of the total sample of 65 patients, 37

had a prior history of psychiatric hospitalization.

Of the

33 voluntary patients, 16 had been hospitalized previously,
as compared to 21 of the 32 involuntary patients.

The aver-

age length of stay was 6.1 days for the voluntary patients
and 7.6 days for involuntary patients.

All of the patients

sampled were considered unable to pay for psychiatric
treatment because they typically had an income (one person)
of under $390.00 per month.

(This is the case for all pa-

tients admitted to the CSU).

This information was collected

by checking each patient's clinical record after completion
of Rotter's I-E (1966) questionnaire.

Setting
The research was conducted at the psychiatric facility
mentioned above, the CSU.

This 30 bed unit relies on milieu,

group and recreational therapy, with ataractic medications
( tranquilizers,

antidepressants) used consistently.

Be-

sides the psychiatrists, the CSU staff consists of psychiatric nurses, social workers, technicians, and aides, all of
whom are in direct contact with the patient during treatment.
This treatment staff helps to facilitate change through
teaching responsibility for behavior, control and awareness
of symptoms and learning socialization skills (often with
support and follow-up thro~gh local mental health centers)·
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The CSU is an open, rather than secure, psychiatric facility, but both voluntary and involuntary patients are treated
there.

At the CSU, crisis stabilization provides a protec-

tive environment, usually not exceeding five days.

One goal

of treatment is to facilitate rapid recovery so that the patient can return to the community.

At times, due to the

severity of a person's illness, a return to the community is
not practicable, and other arrangements (such as placement
at a state hospital or longer treatment at the CSU) are made.

Procedure
Rotter's (1966) I-E Locus of Control scale was individually administered by this experimenter to patients admitted to the CSU described above.

An

attempt was made to

administer this measure to each consecutive admission within 24 hours of that actual admission.
not to participate, while

e~ght

Three patients chose

more remained too acutely

ill to successfully complete the questionnaire.

The I-E

scale was also readrninistered to forty-one of the above patients prior to their discharge from the CSU.

The other

24 patients either eloped (left the CSU without permission),
declined, or were discharged before the I-E scale could be
readministered.

This measure was administered to each pa-

tient in a private room at the CSU where the patient was observed by the experimenter.
as follows:

(Rotter, 1966):

Instructions for this scale are
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This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which
certain important events in our society affect different people. Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the one statement
of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe to be more true rather than the one you think you
should choose or the one you would like to be true.
This is a measure of personal belief; obviously, there
are no right or wrong answers ... Please answer these
items carefully but do not spend too much time on any
one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice ...
In some instances, you may discover that you believe
both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure
to select the one you more strongly believe to be the
case as far as you're concerned. Also, try to respond
to each item independently when making your choice; do
not be influenced by your previous choice (p. 26).
The patients were given the questionnaire (Rotter's I-E
scale) which required them to circle their responses either
a or b.

Scoring was accomplished by adding one point each

time an external statement was selected by the subject, with
the range of scores being from 0 to 23.
forced choice scale, with 29 items.
are included which are not scored.

The I-E scale is a

Six filler questions
The 23 items which are

critical to this study attempt to measure the subject's
perceptions as to his or her own ability to control events
as being a consequence of his or her own actions and beliefs.

V.

RESULTS

An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if there was a significant difference in locus of control scores between males and females.

Results were similar

to Rotter's (1966) findings that differences between male
and female college students was insignificant.

A t score

of -1.342 failed to show any difference due to sex.

Thus,

the data were pooled and no sex differentiation was considered in subsequent analyses.
A two way factorial analysis of variance was performed
to determine differences in the patient's initial locus of
control scores.

The independent variables were commitment

status (involuntary and voluntary), diagnosis (thought disorders, affective disorders and other psychiatric diagnoses).
The dependent measure was the I-E score.

Analysis of

variance results are summarized in Table I.

No significant

difference was found due to commitment status (F [l,59]
1.0191).

=

The interaction of status and diagnosis also was

nonsignificant (F [2,59]

=

.1979).

This is in contrast to

Harrow and Ferrante's (1969) finding that I-E scores were
influenced by diagnosis.
I-E score changes were also examined comparing patients
at the time of admission versus the time of . discharge.
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Table I
Analysis of Variance Comparing
Difference Scores on First
Administration of the I-E Scale

Source

df

MS

Commitment status
(voluntary versus
involuntary)

1, 59

19.1302

1.0191

Diagnosis (thought
versus affective
versus other disorders)

2, 59

3.7541

.2000

Interaction

2, 59

3.7160

.1979

F
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was predicted that both voluntary and involuntary patients
would score in a more internal direction.

Of the original

65 patients, 41 completed the I-E scale prior to discharge.
Using the data obtained from these patients, a 2 x 3 x 2
analysis of variance was performed utilizing commitment
status, diagnosis, and the score obtained at admission or
discharge.

Mean scores are presented in Table II, and F

ratios are presented in Table III.
As in the earlier analysis, no significant differences
were found due to status (F [1,35]
(F [2,35] =

=

.8145), diagnosis

.1478), or their interaction (F [2,35) = .4412)

which is similar to results obtained by Harrow and Ferrante
(1969).

Differences due to score changes at admission ver-

sus discharge were not significant (F ~l,3D = 2.2049).

In-

teractional effects due to status and change scores were insignificant (F cl,35) = .0100)

I

as well as interactional

effects due to diagnosis and change scores (F (2,35] = 1.4125).
The interaction effect of all three (status, diagnosis, and
change scores) variables was nonsignificant as well
2. 3387).

(~[_2,3iJ=
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TABLE III
Mean Scores Obtained on Both
Administrations of the I-E
Scale by Diagnosis and Commitment Status

First Administration

Voluntary

Diagnosis

Involuntary

Thought Disorder

9.57

9.85

Affective Disorder

9.30

11.5

Other Disorders

8.83

10.125

Second Administration

Thought Disorder

10.0

Affective Disorder

8.50

Other Disorders

6.33

9.833

7.75
11.0
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Table III
Analysis of Variance Comparing
Difference Scores on Both
Administrations of the I-E Scale

Source

df

MS

F

Commitment status

1, 35

27.9199

.8145

Diagnosis

2I

35

5.0630

.1478

Interaction (status x
diagnosis)

2I

35

15.1239

.4412

Change Scores
(admission versus
discharge)

1, 35

12.0383

2.2049

Interactions (status x
change scores)

1, 35

.0547

.0100

Interactions (diagnosis
x change scores)

2, 35

7.7121

1.4125

Interactions (status x
diagnosis x change
scores)

2I

35

12.768

2.3387

VI.

DISCUSSION

The first hypothesis that there would be a significant
difference in locus of control scores was not confirmed.
This is in contrast to the original expectation that there
would be significant differences based on Levenson's (1973)
findings that involuntary patients perceived control by
powerful others more often than voluntary patients.

It was

also expected that diagnosis would be a significant factor
here, since other research (Harrow and Ferrante, 1969), indicated that I-E scores were influenced by acute psychiatric
symptoms.

This expectation was not confirmed either, as no

significant difference was found due to diagnosis.
It should be noted that both Harrow and Ferrante's
(1969) and Levenson's (1973) studies, patients who completed
the locus of control questionnaires were hospitalized for a
long term period, usually several weeks, in a state hospital
setting.

This is unlike the patients at the CSU who were

admitted in acute crisis and length of stay averaged just
under one week (6.9 days).

Also, the patients at the CSU

were admitted while in acute crisis, as compared to patients
at the state hospital.

Several psychotic patients (n=B) at

the CSU remained too acute to complete the questionnaire.
Many of the other psychotic patients who did complete the
I-E scale did so only after they were medicated for at least
49
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one whole day, thus reducing symptoms.

Most of the non-

psychotic patients {n=34) completed the I-E scale immediately upon admission.
Previous research {Fontana, Klein, Lewis, and Levine,
1968) demonstrated that psychiatric patients were able to
present as sick or healthy, depending upon their purposes.
Several of the committed patients who had extremely low I-E
scores {n=S)

faced the prospect of having a court appearance

to determine whether they would be committed for a longer
period of time.

It is logical to speculate that these pa-

tients may have been trying to present themselves as internally oriented so as to appear normal to the staff and
hence be able to influence their court hearing.

Their low

I-E scores drove down the overall mean scores for involuntary
patients, possibly accounting for the nonsignificant results.
The hypothesis that locus of control scores would, as
a result of treatment, change in a more internal direction
was not confirmed.
Ferrante's (1969)

This is consistent with Harrow and
result that, overall, there were no sig-

nificant differences in I-E scores due to treatment.

At the

end of six weeks treatment, Harrow and Ferrante found that
patients labelled both manic depressives and character disorders had significant change scores.

There was not any

significant differences in I-E scores due to diagnosis at
the end of treatment in this study.

Here, the length of

hospitalization is again an important issue.

Patients in
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Harrow and Ferrante's (1969) study had a far longer treatment period (six weeks) than did patients admitted to the
CSU (who averaged 6.9 days).
As cited above, Levenson (1973) found that involuntary
patients perceived control by powerful others and Harrow
and Ferrante (1969)

found that the interaction of diagnosis

and length of hospitalization was significant.

With the

exception of these two results, the bulk of research indicates that, overall, locus of control orientation does not
change as a result of psychiatric treatment.
Gove and Fain (1977) reached a similar conclusion after
assessing state hospital psychiatric patients in terms of
demographic variables and the nature and severity of their
problems.
There is

nothi~g

in these results supporting the notion

that in terms of treatment, involuntary commitment is detrimental to the patient, as Szasz (1977) had concluded.

Since

the debate concerning involuntary hospitalization continues,
it remains relevant to pursue the effects of involuntary
commitment on psychiatric treatment.

Research involving

other personality variables in relation to involuntary commitment can help to clarify what does happen to patients'
attitudes and behaviors when they are committed against
their will.
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